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Abstract 
We present results from an extensive discrete choice experiment, which was conducted in 
three countries (Norway, Scotland, and England) with the aim of disclosing stated 
prescription behaviour in different decision making contexts and across different cost 
containment cultures. We show that GPs in all countries respond to information about 
societal costs, benefits and effectiveness, and that they make trade-offs between them. The 
UK GPs have higher willingness to accept costs when they can prescribe medicines that are 
cheaper or more preferred by the patient, while Norwegian GPs tend to have higher 
willingness to accept costs for attributes regarding effectiveness or the doctors’ experience. In 
general there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity also within each country. We discuss 
the results from the DCE in the light of the GPs’ two conflicting agency roles and what we 
know about the incentive structures and cultures in the different countries.   
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1. Introduction 
The demand for, and total spending on, health services is increasing all over the world. This 
trend makes the discussion of rationing and prioritization in the health sector, although 
difficult and sometimes even unpleasant, ever more relevant and necessary. In practice most 
national and local health authorities recognize the need to ration and to influence doctors’ 
choices of treatment directly or indirectly through guidelines and various types of economic 
incentives. How authorities try to affect these choices differ between health systems, as do 
the responses of the doctors.     
The general practitioner (GP) is a key decision-maker in the health care sector and in past 
decades much research has been conducted in order to better understand GP behaviours. 
Seminal articles have presented theoretical models of GP behaviour (Ellis & McGuire, 1986; 
Harsanyi, 1955; McCombs, 1984; McGuire, 2000; Thornton & Eakin, 1997) and a substantial 
amount of empirical research has been conducted on the impact of organizational 
characteristics on delivery of GP services, focusing mostly on remuneration systems (Ellis & 
McGuire, 1990; Gosden et al., 2000; Laffont & Tirole, 1993) and the GP gate keeper role 
(Brekke et al., 2007; Dusheiko et al., 2006). However, much less is known about doctors’ 
behaviour in publicly-oriented systems which have a high degree of focus on cost-
containment and guidelines. 
Prescription behaviour is an area where GPs’ decisions influence implicit prioritization, and it 
is arguably an important one.  A substantial component of health care budgets is drug 
expenditures; as an example relevant for this study, GP prescriptions in both England and 
Scotland amount to around 40% of NHS spending in primary care (Department of Health, 
2012; ISD Scotland, 2016), which constitutes 10% of total NHS spending (Audit Scotland, 
2013; HSCIC, 2015), and there is a large potential for reducing drug expenditures if GPs take 
a social (cost) perspective when deciding which drug to prescribe. In a principal-agent world 
where GPs’ loyalties are torn between the society as a whole and the individual patient, this 
would imply that GPs emphasize their role as gate keepers for society relative to the role as 
the patient’s advocate. When it comes to GPs’ prescription behaviour, the gate keeper role is 
in many countries strengthened by national guidelines, encouragement of generic 
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prescription, audits, and pharmacist visits (Busse, 2005; Dixon, 1997; Granlund et al., 2006; 
Robert et al., 1997; Rodgers et al., 1999; Søndergaard, 2002).  
 
This paper presents an experimental study, which provides important insights for policy 
making. Eliciting behavioural patterns is in accordance with present day focus on behavioural 
economics and represents an example of how experimental economics can contribute to 
better data and consequently to the design of efficient health policies. More specifically, we 
present the results from a discrete choice experiment, which was conducted in three countries 
with the aim of disclosing stated prescription behaviour in different decision making contexts 
and across different organizational cultures. To our knowledge, this study is the first of its 
kind.  
A total of 907 GPs practicing in three relatively similar, but also very different countries; 
England, Scotland, and Norway participated in the experiment. Our unique data set allows us 
to study the relationship between prescription behaviour, different concerns of the doctor, and 
different institutional and historical health policy contexts. In order to form expectations and 
help the interpretation of our results, we anchor our analysis to a principal-agent framework. 
In particular, the weight doctors in different institutional settings put on the often conflicting 
roles as agents for two different principals (i.e. being a gatekeeper for society while at the 
same time being the patient’s advocate) is discussed. 
The paper is organized as follows: The theoretical framework of the dual role of GPs is 
presented in Section 2. In section 3 we present the aims and set-up of our study. We then 
outline the institutional background of the health systems in the three case study countries in 
section 4. Section 5 takes the reader through different aspects of our methodology, from the 
design of the experiment to the econometric estimations. Results are then presented in section 
6, while a discussion is offered in section 7.    
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2. Theoretical framework  
2.1 Dual agency 
The originating literature on agency theory in primary care often uses a conceptual approach 
to describe the principal-agent relationship, where the general practitioner (GP) acts as an 
agent for the patient as well as for the insurer, the latter often in the form of public authorities 
(Blomqvist, 1991; Evans & Brown, 1984; Feldstein, 1974; Phelps, 1997). Asymmetric 
information is typically a problem in both relations; patients are less well-informed about 
appropriate treatments than the attending GP, and the insurer is less well-informed about the 
actual needs for treatment and the necessity of induced costs than the GP.  Thus, both the 
patient and the insurer delegate decision-making authority to the GP assuming that the GP 
makes the best decisions. Perfect agency is, however, difficult to define when the GP faces 
two principals with often conflicting goals, and typically leaves GPs with dilemmas that can 
be difficult to solve in daily decision-making situations (Coast, 2001). Perhaps as a 
consequence, more recent literature shows that the relative weight put on the two roles shifts 
depending on which of the two principals’ concerns are best attended to in the institutional 
setting the doctors are operating within (Pedersen et al., 2014).  
 
2.2 Patient agency 
Patient agency is an equivocal part of a physician’s job description, as emphasised by the 
World Medical Associations international medical oath (World Medical Association, 2006) 
which reads “The health of my patient will be my first consideration”. Taken literally this 
implies that cost considerations (perhaps with the exception of costs to the patient) should not 
influence prescription behaviour. This does not necessarily mean that the GP will act in 
accordance with the patients’ wishes under all circumstances (Scott, 2000; Scott & Vick, 
1999). GPs with a more paternalistic viewpoint would claim that being the patient’s advocate 
means doing what one thinks is the best for the patient, with no particular consideration to the 
patient’s opinion on the matter. Others argue that making the best clinical choices, leading to 
the best outcomes will often be influenced by the patient’s cooperation and compliance, 
which in turn is influenced by the patient’s preferences, economic situation etc.  Finally, 
some GPs simply take the ethical stand for patient empowerment and shared decision 
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making.   
 
From the perspective of the patient the perfect agent is seen as one who chooses as the 
patients themselves would choose if only the patients possessed the same information as the 
GP (Folland et al., 2006; Gafni et al., 1998). Since other attributes than health are typically 
included in this principal’s utility function, the issue of perfect agency is not limited to apply 
to health only (Evans & Brown, 1984; Ryan, 1994), but may for example also include levels 
of co-payment and personal tastes, factors that are not always fully internalised by the GP 
(Neuman & Neuman, 2009). If patients do not pay for health services themselves, an optimal 
level of services from their point of view is unrelated to rationing or concern for others, and 
in systems where this is an option they are likely to choose another GP if they are not 
satisfied with the agency of their current one. The prospect of losing a patient to another GP 
may increase incentives to comply with the patient’s preferences, which sometimes means to 
provide more services and prescriptions.   
In the context of our experiment patient agency can be observed as a general willingness to 
prescribe medicines that maximise patient benefits, lower the costs to the patients and that are 
in accordance with the wishes of the patients, all else equal.   
 
2.3 Social agency 
From the perspective of the insurer, perfect agency is defined by some level of cost-
consciousness. While the goals of the insurer are typically multifold, one core objective is to 
ensure technical and allocative efficiency. The perfect agent should consequently make 
decisions that ensure delivery of equally effective health care services at the lowest attainable 
cost. In order to minimize opportunity costs and thus the possible negative impact this would 
have on the quality and quantity of services delivered to other patient groups, the GP should 
not prescribe expensive drugs unless the higher costs are adequately justified by higher 
benefits. 
 
Public authorities will aim at planning the organisation and financing of the primary care 
sector in such a way that GPs act in the best interest of this third party. In systems where the 
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GPs themselves do not bear the costs of their prescription choices, which to a varying extent 
is the case in the countries we study, they are not likely to pay sufficient consideration to cost 
containment in the eyes of the social planner. Since GPs run private practices it is not 
possible to regulate their behaviour directly, but around the world a number of regulatory and 
financial mechanisms are applied in various attempts to give GPs incentives to take a social 
perspective in their treatment strategies. These range from incentives such as guidelines, 
audits and pharmacist visits, to fundholding schemes, and hard regulation consisting of 
economic sanctions and fines. The effect of the softer kinds of interventions is difficult to 
measure, and the evidence in the literature is mixed. There are, however, examples of 
successful interventions where pharmacists have worked directly with GP practices to control 
prescribing costs (Rodgers et al., 1999). Olsen et al. (2009) find that a voluntary contractual 
agreement between health authorities and GPs to decrease prescription costs through audits 
and feedback on variations in prescription patterns was effective in reducing costs. Also, 
Robert et al. (1997) show that encouragement of generic prescription in Northern Ireland was 
effective in cutting costs. England, Scotland, Germany, and Sweden have all experimented 
with more direct incentives in the form of fundholding schemes where doctors’ profits are 
explicitly linked to operating within budgets, but the effectiveness of such schemes is mixed 
(Delnoij & Brenner, 2000; Granlund et al., 2006). At the end of the scale some interventions 
have used sanctions and fines to try to affect GPs’ prescription behaviour. In the 1990s 
France introduced a system in which GPs had to adhere to certain prescription rules, or risk 
being fined. The scheme led to a reduction in the growth of costs for primary care services 
outside hospitals, yet it is uncertain whether surveillance costs outweighed savings. Also, the 
impact on patient health has not been evaluated (Dixon, 1997). 
 
Social agency is in our experiment measured by the GPs focus on containing costs, i.e. on the 
propensity to focus on the trade-off between total costs and other characteristics associated 
with prescribing, with the aim of ensuring cost-effectiveness.  
 
3 Aims and set-up of study  
In the present study we are not analysing the consequences of a specific intervention, but 
make cross-country comparisons of stated prescription behaviour with the aim of ascertaining 
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whether governance structures and the general operating environment are related to GPs’ 
intended prescription patterns. We define governance structure in this context as the 
contracts, regulations and incentive structures the third party payer/authorities offers the GPs, 
while the operating environment refers to softer aspects like present and historical cost-
containment culture, patient co-payments, focus on patient empowerment, and general 
debates. 
In the design of our experiment, and the choice of attributes, we seek to test the relative 
influence of patient agency and social agency in prescription decisions across three countries 
that mainly differ with respect to the strength and visibility of the third party payer.        
For each country we measure the importance of cost consciousness relative to 1) the 
effectiveness of the medicine (2) the patients’ preferences for the medicine and the co-
payment involved and 3) the GPs’ own experience with the medicine The relative importance 
of total costs and effectiveness reflects cost-effectiveness thresholds and is a social 
consideration, which aims to maximise total health gains subject to budget constraints. The 
trade-off between total costs and patient preferences is indicative of the GPs’ willingness to 
compromise resource use to ensure higher patient benefits. In the same vein the total costs 
versus co-payment signifies the GPs’ willingness to trade-off public money in order to reduce 
the burden of private costs to the patient. Finally, the GPs’ preference for following own 
instincts/experience was included in our experiment in an attempt to capture the GPs’ 
inclination to act as a “free agent” rather than adhering to guidelines or patients’ preferences.    
We hypothesise that the relative weight put on the two often conflicting agencies relates to 
the manner in which concerns for the patient and the third party are attended to in the 
governance structure and the environment the doctors are operating within. However, it is 
uncertain how GPs react to governance structures. They may act in accordance with such 
enforced rules, or if they feel it compromises their role as a GP, they may try to counteract. In 
systems or settings where the patients’ rights are well ensured and patients’ preferences are 
given weight in policy making, GPs may feel more at liberty to focus on social agency, 
consequently focusing less on patient agency and more on the cost effectiveness of health 
care services.  Conversely, in systems or settings where the third party perspective is more 
pronounced and the governance of the GPs is stricter, the GP may feel a stronger obligation 
to act on behalf of the patients within the regulatory constraints of the governance structure.  
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The central research questions that we seek to address in this study are: 
1. Does a stronger cost containment culture combined with stricter GP governance lead 
to GPs taking a more pronounced social agency role (and consequently less 
consideration of patient agency)?  
 2. Is the impact of GP governance moderated if the general operating environment is 
less focused on cost containment and more on patients’ access to health care?   
These research questions make comparison at two levels necessary. In order to answer the 
first question we need to compare countries where the basic features of the health system and 
the needs of the populations are similar, but where the cost containment culture and the 
governance of GPs vary markedly. For this purpose we compare the UK (Scotland and 
England) with Norway, countries that all have health systems which to a large extent are 
based on universal access and the welfare state as a third party payer of services.  They do 
however differ markedly with respect to cost containment culture and the governing of GP 
behaviour, where the UK has stronger governance structure enforcing a closer link between 
GPs’ and the third party’s interest, as well as a more stringent guideline system. In order to 
answer the second research question, we focus on comparing countries that face very similar 
governance structures, but where the operating environment with respect to focus on cost-
containment and patient rights differs. For this purpose we compare Scotland and England. In 
the next section, we describe the main features of the health systems of the three countries in 
more detail.  
Causal interpretations based on our stated preference data are not possible. The purpose of 
our study is rather to empirically generate hypotheses that can give new insights and 
directions for further research.  
 
4. Institutional background 1 
The three countries included in the study all have health systems that to a large extent are 
based on universal access and the welfare state2. At the same time there are some important 
                                                 
1 While we in this section only present a short summary of the main differences in institutions and have 
organised the information thematically in a table, we have also included an appendix where institutions in each 
country are described in more detail.  
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differences between the systems that are relevant to our comparison of doctors’ prescription 
choices.  
 
An important difference between Norway and the two other countries is the governance 
structure. First, in Norway the municipalities contract individual GPs directly, while in 
England and Scotland the practices are contracted, not the individual GPs. Prescription costs 
in Norway are furthermore mainly paid by the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), leading to 
highly indirect links between the third party and the GPs as well as relatively weak incentives 
for both GPs and municipalities to keep costs down, since neither patients, GPs nor the 
contracting municipalities bear the costs of prescriptions directly. In England and Scotland 
the third party is more present through direct incentives to keep costs down as principals 
(Primary Care Trusts in England and Regional Health Boards in Scotland) contracting the GP 
practices have fixed prescription budgets, and practices can be financially rewarded for 
“correct” (restrictive) prescription behaviour.  
The operating environment is also very different in Norway and the UK respectively. While 
there are large resources available in the Norwegian health system, the Scottish and English 
NHS’s spend substantially less on health per capita. Although the populations in the three 
countries are relatively similar when it comes to health service needs, and the share of GDP 
spent on health is in fact quite similar; 9.4% in Norway and 9.6% in the UK in 2010 
according to the OECD, there is considerable variation in the absolute amount of money 
spent on health per capita. For example, in 2010 Norway spent 3502 GBP per capita3 
compared to the 2231 GBP per capita spent in the UK (OECD, 2012). Given that the GPs are 
torn between the interests of their patients on one hand and explicit or implicit budget 
restrictions on the other hand, they are likely to accept higher costs in order to prescribe 
“better” medicines when there are more resources available, all else equal. Thus, one would 
expect incentive structures that seek to align GPs prescription patterns with the objectives of 
the third party to be strengthened by a strong cost containment culture.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 We treat the Scottish and the English health systems as two separate systems; even though Scotland and 
England as part of the United Kingdom share the underlying principles of a national health service, the system 
in Scotland has devolved and is accountable to the Scottish parliament.  
3 Calculated from USD reported in the OECD tables, using exchange rates reported in (OECD, 2013).  
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It is noteworthy, however that even though the GPs are governed in the same manner in 
England and Scotland, there are important differences in the operating environment, which 
may moderate the impact of governance. Firstly, there are differences with respect to 
spending per person; In England spending amounted to 1900 GBP in the period of 2010-
2011, while the Scots spent 2072 GBP per person in the same period (National Audit Office 
UK, 2012). This 10% difference may render the cost containment culture more pronounced in 
England. Another relevant difference is that, while GP practices in Scotland and England are 
contracted under similar conditions, England has continued to reinforce primary care 
incentives even after the abolition of the GP fundholding system. Voluntary practice based 
commissioning has been promoted and now (post survey) a fundamental change in the 
structure of the NHS in England has been implemented. Through this change all general 
practices in England are part of a local Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG), which 
although not in effect at the time of the survey, was very much discussed and debated within 
the time period of the survey. As part of the CCG, GP practices become the holders of the 
majority of the NHS budget in England and become commissioners of secondary care as well 
as commissioners and providers of primary care for their local population.  Finally, the 
Scottish system has abolished patient co-payment completely. This means that there are 
fewer incentives to keep costs down in the Scottish system. More importantly, this feature of 
the Scottish system perhaps reflects a more general tendency for patient advocacy in 
Scotland.  
 
To conclude, we have chosen to compare GPs stated prescription patterns in Norway with 
those of GPs operating in the UK because Norway is a country with a weak cost containment 
culture as well as weak third party governance as compared to Scotland and England. Further, 
comparison of GPs prescription patterns across Scotland and England provides an 
opportunity for isolating the impact of the more general operating environment on GP 
behaviour.  
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5. Methodology 
5.1 Attribute and level selection 
In the design of our experiment, and the choice of attributes, we seek to test the relative 
influence of patient agency and social agency in prescription decisions across our three 
countries. Five attributes with between two and four levels were included in the DCE; they 
are presented with their respective levels in Table 1. These attributes allow us to measure the 
importance of cost consciousness relative to effectiveness of the medicine (social agency), 
patients’ preferences for the medicine and the co-payment involved (patient agency), and GPs 
own experience with the medicine (“free” agency). 
The initial identification of relevant attributes was based predominantly on findings from an 
earlier survey of Norwegian doctors’ adherence to guidelines (Carlsen & Aakvik, 2006; 
Carlsen & Norheim, 2008), existing international research on both prioritization and 
guidelines (Carlsen & Norheim, 2005; Eccles & Grimshaw, 2004; Farquhar et al., 2002; 
Stewart et al., 2003; Strech et al., 2008), as well as theoretical expertise and practical 
experience (with DCEs in general and with conducting DCEs in different local contexts) in 
the international research team. The choice models applied in the analysis rely on the 
assumption that respondents are able to make trade-offs between attributes and their levels in 
order to maximise utility. If the choice alternatives become too complex, there is a risk that 
respondents adopt simplifying heuristics or lexicographic decision rules (Hensher, 2006; 
Scott, 2002; Witt et al., 2009). One source of complexity is the number of attributes. The 
literature is inconclusive on the optimal number of attributes in DCEs but somewhere 
between three and seven seems to be the most common in health economics (Ryan & Gerard, 
2003; Scott, 2002; Witt et al., 2009), and the recent trend has been to reduce the number of 
attributes to five (de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012). We followed this trend, and applied five 
attributes in our experiment. Another source of complexity is not the number, but rather the 
relevance and descriptions of the attributes included (Hensher, 2006). In this study it was 
considered important to develop simple and non-context-specific attributes that would 
translate well into the UK setting. This could potentially come at the cost of respondents 
regarding the choice very hypothetical or their inferring excluded attributes from the included 
ones. As a consequence, the piloting process was very thorough. The reduction from the 
initial set of attributes to the five attributes included, as well as the wording of the attributes 
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and their respective levels were developed in a dynamic process between involved 
researchers and a convenience sample of eight practicing physicians and two medical 
researchers, through iterative piloting. In particular the total cost attribute was given much 
attention since this is essential for our measurement of social agency and patient agency. 
Furthermore, the goal of designing alternatives and choice situations that, although 
hypothetical and generic, resemble real life decisions was continuously evaluated in this 
process.4  The transfer of the DCE to the context of the Scottish and English health services 
was aided by the simple and non-context-specific attributes which helped ensure 
comparability. However, some smaller adjustments were made to ensure that the levels 
chosen for patient costs and total costs were relevant in all countries. England and Scotland 
were operating within the same market for drugs as Norway (all within the European 
Economic Area). The total cost levels applied for Norway were therefore simply adjusted by 
a value reflecting the exchange rate at the time of the survey. The patient cost attribute levels 
were more complex to transfer as there is a different system of co-payment across the three 
countries. The maximum co-payment level of £100 for England was taken from the cost of an 
annual prepayment certificate that can be purchased by a patient to cover the cost of all 
prescriptions required. This provides a notional maximum amount that GPs would consider 
realistic although the vast majority of patients (~90%) are exempt from co-payment. In 
Scotland prescription charges have historically mirrored those in England. Since the policy of 
no co-payments for prescriptions in Scotland was a relatively new policy we chose to apply 
the same patient cost levels in England and Scotland, with a statement asking GPs to consider 
that the ”patient costs are pure out-of-pocket expenses to the patient and are not covered by 
any free prescriptions or exemption list”. 
 
(Table 1 around here) 
 
5.2 The prescription choice 
Our interest lies in how GPs balance the different agencies in their daily practice, here 
exemplified by a prescription choice. The description of the patient is consequently 
                                                 
4 More details concerning the choice of attributes and levels in the Norwegian experiment can be found in 
Carlsen et al. (2012). 
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deliberately very generic. It is however important that the task is not so generic that it seems 
meaningless to the respondents. As for the choice of attributes and levels, the patient 
description was therefore repeatedly tested, discussed, changed, and retested in the piloting 
process. In the resulting DCE, the respondents were presented with the following generic 
patient description:  
 
“Imagine a patient, Mrs Howes,5 50 years of age, who has just been diagnosed with a 
chronic condition, which requires preventive medication. Mrs Howes has, with the right 
medication, a good prognosis for continuing in full employment. However, she currently feels 
that she has reduced quality of life with her condition.”  
 
The respondents were then asked to indicate which of two given alternative medicines they 
would prescribe for this patient. An example of the exercise is given in Figure 1.  
 
(Figure 1 around here)  
 
5.3 Experimental design 
To construct the experimental design we used an algorithm that simultaneously created the 
alternative medicines and paired them into choice situations, resulting in a D-efficient design 
with 24 choice sets. D-efficient designs offer an efficient combination of orthogonality, level 
balance and minimum overlap (Hensher et al., 2005). The applied design allowed for 
estimation of all main effects as well as interactions between some of the attributes (patient 
preference total costs, patient preference patient costs, patient preference effect) 6. To 
avoid exhausting respondents, the 24 choice sets were randomly divided into two blocks, 
resulting in each doctor making 12 choices. The number of choice sets to include in a DCE is 
an open question in the literature, but the recent trend has been to let participants make an 
increasing number of choices (de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012). Considering that it took around 
                                                 
5 In Norwegian, this common name was translated to “Fru Hansen.”  
6 We did not end up using these interaction effects in the analysis, as they never appeared significant and their 
inclusion did not alter the main results. The same has been found in other studies (Kolstad, 2011). 
× × ×
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10 minutes to answer the whole questionnaire and that the respondents in the pilot did not 
find the task particularly burdensome, we concluded that 12 was a manageable number of 
choices. 
 
5.4 Questionnaire design 
The DCE formed the main part of the questionnaire. In addition, in a separate section of the 
questionnaire, the doctors were asked to rank the importance of different criteria for 
prioritization (corresponding to the attributes in the DCE). This was an attempt to be able to 
separate norms, attitudes and intentions from actual behaviour and is followed up on 
elsewhere (Carlsen et al., 2012; Hole et al., 2013).  
 
5.5 Sample and data collection 
The Norwegian data were collected through an Internet-based survey during the months of 
December 2010 and January 2011. In total, 1127 randomly chosen GPs received an invitation 
to participate in the study electronically. There were three reminders; two in December and 
one in January.  
Data in Scotland was collected by means of a paper questionnaire sent in November 2011 to a 
sample of 1,500 Scottish GPs drawn at random from the General Practitioner Contractor 
Database (GPCD) maintained by the Information Statistics Division (ISD, NHS National 
Services Scotland). One reminder was sent after three weeks.   
Data in England was also collected by means of a paper questionnaire. A sample of 1,500 
GPs was drawn at random from a list of GPs in GP Practices published by the NHS in 
England. The survey was posted in November 2011 with one reminder sent three weeks later. 
Ethical clearances (where required) were received from the right instances in all countries.  
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5.6 The choice model and corresponding empirical specification 
We assume that the utility doctor n derives from choosing medication j in choice situation t 
can be written as  
                            (1) 
where pnjt represents the total cost of prescribing the medication and xnjt is a vector of other 
attributes of the medication, such as its effectiveness. The coefficients  and  vary 
randomly over respondents and  is assumed to be extreme value distributed with variance
, where is an individual specific scale parameter. 
The utility function in equation (1) can be divided by the scale parameter without affecting 
behaviour. This results in an equation with an error term with constant variance for all 
respondents.  
  (2)    
Defining the utility parameters as  and , utility can be written as  
   (3) 
Equation (3) is referred to as the model in preference space (Train & Weeks, 2005). Using the 
definition of willingness to pay: , the utility model can be rewritten in WTP 
space: 
  (4) 
Equation (3) and (4) are behaviourally equivalent. We estimate equation (4), where the WTP 
coefficients are independent of scale since the scale parameter cancels out in the expression, 
while the price coefficient incorporates scale (Hole & Kolstad, 2012; Train & Weeks, 2005). 
Greene and Hensher (2010) show that the WTP space model can be expressed as a special 
case of the generalized multinomial logit model proposed by (Fiebig et al., 2010). The 
coefficients in the WTP space model are estimated in Stata 12 using the gmnl command (Gu 
et al., 2013). In the main specification all WTPs have normal distributions, while the total 
njt n njt n njt njtU p xα β ε′= − + +
nα nβ
njtε
)6/( 22 πµn nµ
6/2π
( ) ( )njt n n njt n n njt njtU p xα µ β µ ε′= − + +
)/( nnn µαλ = )/( nnnc µβ=
njt n njt n njt njtU p c xλ ε′= − + +
nnn cwtp λ/=
njt n njt n njt njtU p wtp xλ ε′ = − + + 
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cost coefficient has a log-normal distribution. 7 The log-likelihood function is simulated using 
5,000 Halton draws.  
There are several advantages to estimating the models in willingness to pay space instead of 
in preference space. Firstly, the fact that the WTP distributions are specified directly in the 
estimation process has been found to result in more realistic estimates of WTP  (Hole & 
Kolstad, 2012; Scarpa et al., 2008). Secondly, since the WTP estimates are independent of 
scale, we can compare the estimates from models estimated on different country-specific 
datasets directly, avoiding the usual complications when comparing estimates from different 
choice models.  To further ensure cross country comparability we convert the Norwegian 
WTP estimates to purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted British pounds in the reported 
results.8  
It should be noted that our WTP measures cannot be interpreted in the same way as those 
normally reported in the WTP literature, since our denominator is the total costs to society of 
prescribing a medicine – not the decision maker’s private costs. A better formulation is 
possibly “willingness to accept costs borne by the society” (WTAC), which we will refer to 
in the rest of this paper.  The WTAC reflects the GPs role as agent for society and as such 
their willingness for society to pay. Significance tests for differences between the three 
countries’ WTACs  are carried out using the complete combinatorial approach described in 
Poe et al. (2005). The Poe et al. approach involves taking many draws from the distributions 
of the WTACs and calculating the difference between them. If the proportion of draws in 
which the WTAC of one country is higher than the WTAC of another country exceeds a 
given significance level, the difference is concluded to be significant. 
Individual-level WTACs were calculated using the method proposed by Revelt and Train 
(2000). These are estimates of the average preferences of the group of GPs who made the 
same choices when faced with the same block of 12 choice sets. The distributions of the 
individual-level WTACs are represented graphically using kernel density plots. 
 
                                                 
7 All the coefficients are assumed to be independent. We have also estimated models with correlated coefficients 
which led to qualitatively similar results. The results from the models with correlated coefficients are available 
on request. 
8 Using 2011 data published by the OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SNA_TABLE4. 
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5.7 Additional analyses 
To explore whether there is evidence of observed preference heterogeneity we run an 
additional regression with interactions between the alternative attributes and dummy 
variables for the respondent being female and having practiced medicine for more than 20 
years9.  
We also carry out tests for attribute dominance, i.e. whether respondents choose on the basis 
of a single attribute. If a respondent is found to always choose the alternative with the lowest 
total costs for example, that respondent is deemed to have a ‘dominant’ preference for lower 
total costs. It should be noted that evidence of attribute dominance according to this simple 
test does not conclusively rule out that the respondent is using a compensatory decision rule 
(Lancsar & Louviere, 2006). It could simply be that the ranges of the remaining attributes in 
the experiment are not large enough to incite the respondent to make trade-offs. 
Consequently, if a high proportion of respondents is found to choose on the basis of a single 
attribute this may cast doubt on the appropriateness of the design. We are particularly 
interested to see if there is evidence for dominance in the case of the total cost and 
effectiveness attributes, which we consider to be the potentially most problematic attributes 
in this respect. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for our sample of GPs in the three countries. The 
response rates were relatively low (from 16.9% to 25.2%), which is unfortunately an 
increasing trend for surveys of clinicians (Carlsen et al., 2012; VanGeest et al., 2007). 
However the samples reflect the respective populations of GPs in each country10. When 
comparing characteristics of the GPs across countries however, there are some differences. 
                                                 
9 We also considered including interactions with age. However, since age is highly correlated with length of 
practice, and it becomes increasingly difficult to get the models to converge when more parameters are included, 
we ended up including only length of practice. 
10 Exact and directly comparable statistics for the whole population of GPs in the three countries is unfortunately 
not available, but the available information supports our statement that “the samples reflect the respective 
populations of GPs in each country”. To the extent that any groups are misrepresented in our sample and the 
behavior of these groups systematically differ from the others with respect to agency, this may lead to a bias in 
our results.   
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The GPs in the Scottish sample are on average about 3.5 years older than those in the English 
sample, with the average age of the Norwegian GPs somewhere in the middle. Furthermore, 
the proportion of female GPs is higher in Scotland (48%) and Norway (43%) than in England 
(35%). There are no substantial differences among the samples in terms of how long the GPs 
have practiced, but the English GPs have on average about a year more experience than the 
Scottish and Norwegian GPs.    
The results from the tests for dominant preferences are reported in Table 3 which shows that 
the proportion of dominant preferences for any attribute is generally lower than 10%. 
Exceptions are the total cost attribute in the case of Scotland and England, and the patient 
preference attribute, which on the face of it appears to have a very high level of dominance in 
all countries. However, this is an artefact of the survey design; since we allowed for 
interaction effects between the patient preference attribute and several other attributes, the 
levels for the patient preference attribute are the same in 83% of the choice sets. This makes 
the results of the dominance test uninformative in the case of this attribute, as evidence of 
dominance can happen purely by chance. For the total cost attribute, this happened in 8% of 
the choice sets in contrast to the rest of the attributes that were never the same. Since the level 
of attribute dominance is relatively low for the other attributes we conclude that there is 
limited evidence for ‘dominant’ preferences in this application. 
 
6.2 Main results 
6.2.1 Absolute differences in WTAC between countries 
The pattern that emerges from the upper half of Table 4 is that GPs in all countries are 
significantly less prone to choose alternatives with higher total costs, all else equal. They are 
most willing to impose high total costs on society in order to prescribe medicines with high 
effectiveness, and in order to follow the patient’s preferences. However, when it comes to 
attributes regarding effectiveness GPs in the UK tend to have lower WTACs than Norwegian 
GPs. Conversely, for attributes directly related to the patient, the UK GPs have higher 
estimated mean WTACs.  
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To be more specific, the mean WTAC for higher effectiveness is significantly lower in 
England than in Scotland and Norway11. There is also a significant difference between 
Scotland and Norway with respect to the 75% effectiveness, with Scottish GPs having the 
lowest WTAC on average. The mean WTAC for following patient preferences, on the other 
hand, is statistically significantly higher in Scotland than in the two other countries, with no 
measurable difference between Norway and England. Norwegian GPs have generally lower 
WTAC to avoid the lowest level of patient costs than their UK colleagues. This can be 
thought of as the willingness to avoid imposing costs on the patient, as the reference category 
is zero patient costs. Within the UK, the English GPs have the highest WTAC. There are no 
significant differences between the countries with respect to the highest level of patient costs. 
Finally, GPs in all countries are willing to accept relatively high costs in order to prescribe 
medicines they have a good experience with relative to having little or no experience.  Again 
there are significant differences between Norway on one hand and the UK countries on the 
other hand, with Norwegian GPs exhibiting the highest mean WTAC.  
 
6.2.2 Within countries 
When studying the indirect ranking of attributes and their levels12 within each country, an 
interesting pattern appears; Scottish and English GPs indirectly rank patient preferences over 
the highest level of effectiveness (differences are significant at 1% level in Scotland, 5% 
level in England). Hence, in England and Scotland the GPs are on average willing to accept 
the highest total costs to prescribe the patient’s preferred medicine rather than the one the 
patient did not prefer, while they accept the second highest costs in order to prescribe the 
most effective medicine rather than the one with 60% effectiveness. In Norway on the other 
hand there is weak evidence of the opposite; the WTAC for prescribing the medicine with 
90% effect is significantly higher than that for prescribing according to the patient’s 
preferences at the 10% level. This is in line with the earlier observation that UK GPs have 
higher WTACs for patient related attributes than Norwegian GPs. GPs in all countries were 
willing to accept the third highest total costs in order to prescribe a medicine the doctor had a 
good experience with rather than a medicine the doctors had little or no experience with. 
                                                 
11 See Table A.2 in the Appendix for an overview of which differences between countries that are statistically 
significant. 
12 We are referring to rankings resulting from the choices made in the DCE. 
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6.3 Heterogeneity 
Perhaps equally important as the heterogeneity between countries is the variation in 
preferences within each country. As can be seen in the lower half of Table 4, which presents 
the standard deviations of the WTAC estimates, the within-country variation is quite large for 
some of the attributes. In particular it is interesting to observe that the weight put on 
effectiveness, patient preferences, and prescribing medicines the GPs have experience with - 
which were the most important attributes in all countries - varies significantly and 
substantially between doctors within each country.  
In particular the standard deviation of the WTAC for prescribing a medication the doctor has 
good relative to little or no experience with, is large relative to the mean in all countries. The 
standard deviation of the WTAC for prescribing the patient’s preferred medicine is 
particularly large relative to the mean in England, while it is relatively low in Scotland 
compared to the other countries. Figures 2-4 present kernel density plots of the distribution of 
individual-level WTACs for those attribute levels with statistically significant standard 
deviations. The figures reveal interesting differences between the three countries’ 
distributions, which are not directly captured by the statistics presented in Table 4. For 
example, the distribution of the doctors’ WTAC for prescribing a drug which the patient 
prefers has the same bimodal shape in Scotland and Norway, but the relative position of the 
distributions indicate that Scottish doctors are generally willing to incur higher costs than 
Norwegian doctors13. The distribution of the English doctors’ WTAC has a very different 
shape, in spite of the mean and standard deviation being similar for all the countries. In the 
case of the WTAC for the doctor having a good experience with the medication the 
distributions are very similar for England and Scotland, while Norwegian doctors tend to 
have somewhat higher WTACs. The picture is similar for the WTAC for increasing the 
effectiveness of the medication from 60% to 90%, but in this case it should also be noted that 
as a group Scottish GPs have higher WTACs than English GPs.  
In order to dig further into the issue of heterogeneity, additional regressions controlling for 
observed heterogeneity were run; Table 5 shows the results of a similar model as that 
                                                 
13 This is a consequence of the PPP adjustment. Without this adjustment the two distributions almost perfectly 
overlap. 
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presented in Table 4, but with interaction effects for gender and practice length included. In 
Norway there is only one systematic difference between the groups; female GPs are willing 
to accept higher total costs than male GPs in order to prescribe the most effective medicine, 
rendering Norwegian female GPs the group of doctors with by far the highest WTAC for this 
attribute. In Scotland, female GPs are willing to accept higher costs than male GPs in order to 
prescribe a medicine they have a good experience with. They are also more concerned with 
avoiding patient costs than male GPs. In both Scotland and England GPs with more 
experience put less weight on patient preferences. Further, more experienced GPs in England 
place a greater emphasis on avoiding patient costs.      
 
7. Discussion  
Overall we find that while GPs in all three countries have a preference for prescribing less 
expensive medications they are also willing to accept relatively high total costs in order to 
deliver the best services for their patients. We also find that the relative weight placed on 
these two concerns vary among GPs both within and across countries.  
However, when it comes to attributes regarding effectiveness or the doctors’ experience, GPs 
in the UK have statistically significantly lower WTACs than Norwegian GPs. Although we 
cannot draw any definitive conclusions as to causality, our results imply that a stronger cost 
containment culture combined with stricter GP governance does lead to GPs taking a more 
pronounced social agency role with increased focus on cost containment.  
At the same time we see that WTAC is statistically significantly lower amongst English GPs 
than Scottish GP, which suggests that the effect of a similar governance structure in the two 
countries is modified by different operating environments. The stronger cost containment 
focus in England seems to strengthen the social agency role. Further, the mean WTAC for 
following patient preferences is statistically significantly higher in Scotland where there has 
been an active debate about patient interests, which seems to have strengthened patient 
agency.  
Overall, our two core research questions have been answered in the affirmative: a strong cost 
containment culture combined with strong governance strengthens the GPs social agency 
role, but cultural aspects appear to be an important moderator.   
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Our results also indicate that a stronger governance structure, as seen in England and 
Scotland, may generate a counter reaction from the GPs. We observe that for attributes 
directly related to the patient (patient costs and patient preferences), the UK GPs have higher 
estimated mean WTACs than do Norwegian GPs. This is somewhat surprising, as one would 
expect that a strong social agency role would crowd out patient agency. This does not appear 
to be the case. As referred to in Section 2, GPs could within their authorised room for 
decision-making, put more weight on their role as a patients’ advocate relative to other 
concerns when the interests of society are well taken care of through regulations and other 
features of the system.  A recent study on GPs shows that the GPs' role as agent for their 
patients is clearly strengthened in the presence of national recommendations that to a large 
degree ensure cost effectiveness (Pedersen et al., 2014).  
An alternative, or perhaps additional, explanation of differences in the emphasis on patient 
preferences is varying degrees of competition in the different systems. In a system with more 
competition for patients, adhering to patient preferences will be more profitable, or put 
differently; not adhering to patient preferences will have larger costs. In Norway there is a 
certain level of competition for patients; there is on average surplus capacity, 44% of the lists 
were open for new patients in 2010, and patients are allowed to change GP twice a year. 
However in practice the competition does not seem to be very fierce; in 2010 only 5.8% of 
patients actually changed their GP.  In both Scotland and England, competition between 
practices is limited by restrictions placed on patients, who can only register with a practice if 
their permanent residency falls within the practice area boundary. There is little published 
research that relates to competition for patients within a restricted geographical area, and the 
little evidence there is (see for example Monitor (2015)) does not indicate that the 
competition is strong. Hence, we conclude that competition for patients is not a likely driver 
for our results.  
A distinct feature of our results is the large heterogeneity in the responses within countries. 
The English GPs in particular do not seem to agree on priorities. When looking at the WTAC 
distributions for following patient preferences in Figure 2, English GPs stand out as a clear 
outlier group with a markedly different distribution involving a large degree of heterogeneity.  
There is as noted earlier also significant heterogeneity in Scotland and Norway with respect 
to the WTACs for following patient preferences, but it is smaller and the GPs in these 
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countries seem to be more polarized in their implicit prioritization of patient preferences.  
Even though the Scottish and English GPs in many respects make on average very similar 
choices, the recent Scottish debates about patient co-payment may have led to more attention 
to patient preferences and influenced the preferences of the GPs leading to less heterogeneity 
than in England.  
Our preferred interpretation of the observed heterogeneity is that GPs are generally torn 
between concerns in their double agency role, and react differently based on their 
preferences, which in turn are most likely reflecting differences in context-related 
professional attitudes and variations in the degrees of alliance to the two principals. An 
alternative reason why we observe the relatively large heterogeneity within countries could 
be that the GPs have different beliefs about what will happen to Mrs Howes, the hypothetical 
subject of the Discrete Choice Experiment, if they for example decide not to prescribe the 
most effective medicine. We give a certain indication of how Mrs Howes will do without 
medicine in the description, but the question is whether this description is taken into account 
at all and if so, whether it is sufficient to make the respondents have the same beliefs about 
the consequences of their choice. In the Norwegian setting, two additional versions of the 
experiment were distributed – in these versions the severity of Mrs. Howes’ condition were 
increased and the consequences of not being medicated described accordingly. The 
preliminary analysis of these additional experiments shows that the WTACs for improved 
effectiveness increased when Mrs. Howes’ condition became more severe14, indicating that 
respondents were in fact taking the baseline alternative into account and adjusting their 
behaviour when the baseline changed. It is likely that there is some heterogeneity left when it 
comes to exactly how the GPs conceive Mrs. Howes condition with and without medications 
with different effectiveness, but the pattern of increased willingness to accept costs as the 
severity of the condition increases, goes a long way in indicating that the respondents have a 
relatively similar interpretation of the baseline scenario.        
 
                                                 
14 Results available on request. 
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8. Conclusion 
Our experimental study suggests that GPs respond to information about societal costs, 
benefits and effectiveness, and that they make trade-offs between them. The degree to which 
GPs align their role as social or patient agents seems to depend on both the governance 
structure and the general environment in which the operate.  
Three core lessons can be learnt from our study. First, a strong sense of social agency does 
not necessarily crowd out patient agency. Second, local culture and operating environment 
may significantly moderate the effect of governance, and so one should be careful in 
transferring experiences with incentive structures and regulatory settings across cultural 
settings. Third, a change of culture and norms may be just as effective as direct governance. 
Policy makers have a choice between enforcing the link between the third party and GPs’ 
interests either through stricter governance or through more soft regulations such as 
campaigns, influencing the curriculum at medical school, initiating debates, etc. Both venues 
may be equally effective.  
It should be noted that our study cannot pin down any causal relationship, there was no 
reform or natural experiment we could apply to the comparison of GPs in the different 
countries, but our results give indicative evidence that the organization of the national health 
system, national priorities and debates can influence doctors’ choices. More targeted studies 
linking various aspects of local context to priorities and choices seem an interesting and 
important avenue for further research.   
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Figures 
Figure 1 – Example of a choice situation 
  
Medicine A 
 
Medicine B 
 
Benefit/effect 
 
• The best on the market, 
90% normally respond 
to this medicine 
 
 
• 60% normally respond 
to this medicine 
 
Patient costs per year • 50 GBP 
 
• 100 GBP 
 
Total costs per year • 5000 GBP 
 
• 1000 GBP 
 
Patient’s own wishes 
about medication 
• prefers this (rather than 
the other) 
 
• does not prefer this (to 
the other) 
 
Your experience with 
this medication 
• little or none 
 
• good  
 
Which medicine will 
you choose? (please 
cross) 
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Figure 2 – Distribution of WTAC for “patient prefers medication” 
 
Figure 3 – Distribution of WTAC for doctor having a good experience with med. 
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Figure 4 – Distribution of WTAC for 90% effect (compared to 60%) 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Attributes and levels 
Attributes 
& levels 
Total costs Effect Patient costs Patient 
preference 
Physician’s 
experience 
 
Level 1 
 
500 GBP 
5000 NOK 
 
 
60% normally 
respond to this 
medicine 
 
 
Free 
 
Does not 
prefer this 
medicine  
 
Little or none 
Level 2 1000 GBP 
10 000 NOK 
 
75% normally 
respond to this 
medicine 
 
50 GBP 
1000 NOK 
 
Prefers this 
medicine 
Good 
Level 3 2500 GBP 
25 000 NOK 
 
The best on the 
market; 90% 
normally 
respond to this 
medicine 
 
100 GBP 
1800 NOK 
 
  
Level 4 5000 GBP 
50 000 NOK 
    
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
  Norway Scotland England 
N 284 370 253 
    
Sex (1=female)    
      Mean 0.43 0.48 0.35 
 
   
Age    
      Mean 47.01 45.79 49.21 
      SD 10.64 8.73 8.08 
      Min - max 28 - 68 33 - 62 33 - 62 
 
   
Years of practice    
      Mean 17.49 17.40 18.78 
      SD 11.06 10.07 9.01 
      Min - max 1 – 43 0 – 42 0 – 38 
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Table 3 – Dominance tests 
 Norway Scotland England 
Total costs 6.3% 16.3% 15.8% 
    
Effect  4.9% 5.7% 2.8% 
    
Patient costs  0% 0% 0% 
    
Patient prefers medicine 66.2% 67.5% 54.5% 
    
Doctor has good experience  4.6% 2.2% 3.2% 
with the medicine    
Note: The patient preference attribute was the same in 83% of the choices in the design,  
compared to 8% for total cost and 0% for the remaining attributes. 
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Table 4 - WTAC across countries 
 Norway Scotland England 
Mean    
Effect 75%  14.822*** 10.742*** 7.607*** 
(compared to 60%) [12.689,16.956] [8.956,12.527] [5.832,9.381] 
    
Effect 90%  35.038*** 33.111*** 27.637*** 
(compared to 60%) [31.875, 38.202] [30.351,35.871] [24.594,30.681] 
    
Patient costs 50 GBP  -7.643*** -10.526*** -13.186*** 
(compared to 0 GBP) [-9.976, -5.310] [-12.643,-8.409] [-15.757,-10.616] 
    
Patient costs 100 GBP  -9.897*** -10.995*** -10.588*** 
(compared to 0 GBP) [-12.076, -7.718] [-12.825,-9.165] [-12.763,-8.414] 
    
Patient prefers medicine 29.882*** 41.721*** 35.444*** 
 [24.210, 35.554] [35.442,48.000] [28.678,42.210] 
    
Doctor has good experience  17.534*** 14.220*** 15.395*** 
with the medicine (relative to little or 
none) 
[15.384, 19.684] [12.440,16.000] [13.103,17.688] 
    
Standard Deviation    
Effect 75% (compared to 60%) 0.218 0.038 0.622 
 [1.920] [1.525] [2.086] 
    
Effect 90% (compared to 60%) 16.619*** 18.968*** 16.262*** 
 [1.409] [1.306] [1.668] 
    
Patient costs 50 GBP  1.018 0.111 2.668 
(compared to 0 GBP) [6.579] [5.976] [3.360] 
    
Patient costs 100 GBP  0.185 0.031 3.996* 
(compared to 0 GBP) [1.942] [1.434] [2.041] 
    
Patient prefers med. 13.896** 17.560*** 25.782*** 
 [5.863] [5.664] [4.243] 
    
Doctor has good experience  11.014*** 10.891*** 10.210*** 
with the med. (relative to little or 
none) 
[1.185] [0.966] [1.410] 
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Total cost    
Mean of ln(coefficient)  -2.468*** -2.400*** -2.489*** 
 [-2.610,-2.326] [-2.516,-2.284] [-2.716,-2.263] 
    
Standard deviation 0.455*** 0.418*** 1.347*** 
of ln(coefficient) [0.118] [0.107] [0.184] 
    
Number of observations 6816 8718 6028 
Number of respondents 284 370 253 
Log Likelihood -1317.166 -1597.448 -1266.804 
All WTAC measures are reported in 100 GBP (PPP adjusted in the case of Norway). The figures in brackets are 
95% confidence intervals for the means and standard errors for the standard deviations. The total cost attribute 
has been multiplied by -1 to make its coefficient positive. ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1 
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Table 5 – Willingness to accept costs - WTP space, with interaction effects 
 Norway   Scotland   England   
 
Main effect Female 
Practice > 20 
years Main effect Female 
Practice > 20 
years Main effect Female 
Practice > 20 
years 
Mean 
 
         
Effect 75%  13.734*** 3.219 0.304 9.612*** 1.292 0.305 5.814*** 0.098 2.568 
(compared to 60%) [10.254, 
17.213] 
[-1.157, 
7.595] 
[-3.862, 
4.470] 
[6.510, 
12.715] 
[-2.329, 
4.913] 
[-3.222, 
3.833] 
[2.660, 
8.968] 
[-3.512, 
3.709] 
[-1.211, 
6.347] 
          
Effect 90%  32.600*** 7.144** -0.026 29.937*** 4.695 0.608 25.131*** 3.816 3.114 
(compared to 60%) [27.435, 
37.765] 
[0.700, 
13.588] 
[-6.248, 
6.196] 
[24.761, 
35.113] 
[-1.122, 
10.511] 
[-5.155, 
6.371] 
[19.779, 
30.484] 
[-2.842, 
10.474] 
[-3.028, 
9.256] 
          
Patient costs 100 GBP  - 8.250*** -0.890 1.935 -7.259*** -4.388* -2.601 -10.702*** 0.817 -5.608** 
(compared to 0 GBP) [-12.170, 
-4.330] 
[-5.875, 
4.095] 
[-2.785, 
6.654] 
[-11.339, 
-3.179] 
[-8.971, 
0.195] 
[-7.118, 
1.916] 
[-14.913, 
-6.492] 
[-4.430, 
6.065] 
[-10.481, 
-0.734] 
          
Patient costs 180 GBP  - 8.396*** -3.627 0.341 -9.573*** -1.814 -2.209 -7.082*** -3.924* -4.283* 
(compared to 0 GBP) [-11.997, 
- 4.795] 
[-8.223, 
0.968] 
[-3.984, 
4.666] 
[-13.012, 
-6.134] 
[-5.780, 
2.152] 
[-6.087, 
1.669] 
[-10.784, 
-3.381] 
[-8.440, 
0.592] 
[-8.618, 
0.051] 
          
Patient prefers med. 28.420*** 7.241 -3.263 46.711*** -1.292 -10.793** 40.757*** -0.479 -10.407* 
 
[20.240, 
36.600] 
[-2.046, 
16.528] 
[-12.133, 
5.606] 
[36.434, 
56.988] 
[-10.403, 
7.819] 
[-19.970, 
-1.616] 
[29.462, 
52.051] 
[-11.742, 
10.784] 
[-22.248, 
1.434] 
          
Doctor has good  18.081*** 1.998 -2.941 12.919*** 5.722*** -2.328 15.162*** -0.011 1.007 
experience with the med. [14.633, 
21.529] 
[-2.348, 
6.345] 
[-7.062, 
1.181] 
[9.613, 
16.225] 
[2.024, 
9.421] 
[-5.993, 
1.338] 
[11.763, 
18.560] 
[-4.037, 
4.015] 
[-2.915, 
4.929] 
          
Standard Deviations          
Effect 75%  0.116   0.119   2.186   
(compared to 60%) [2.139]   [1.534]   [3.090]   
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Effect 90%  16.406***   18.119***   16.892***   
(compared to 60%) [1.445]   [1.345]   [1.672]   
          
Patient costs 100 GBP  0.366   0.078   0.811   
(compared to 0 GBP) [4.737]   [3.518]   [2.400]   
          
Patient costs 180 GBP  0.133   0.002   4.915***   
(compared to 0 GBP) [1.758]   [1.379]   [1.438]   
          
Patient prefers med. 11.561*   16.093***   26.470***   
 [6.432]   [6.145]   [4.548]   
          
Doctor has good  10.978***   10.010***   9.625***   
experience with the med. [1.174]   [1.049]   [1.006]   
          
Total cost          
Mean of ln(coefficient) -2.642*** 0.030 0.009* -2.322*** -0.158 0.001 -2.818*** 0.467* 0.012 
 [--2.903, 
- -2.383] 
[-0.217, 
0.276] 
[-0.001, 
0.020] 
[-2.606, 
-2.038] 
[-0.390, 
0.073] 
[-0.011, 
0.012] 
[-3.370, 
-2.266] 
[-0.049, 
0.984] 
[-0.013, 
0.036] 
          
Standard deviation 0.448***   0.529***   1.441***   
of ln(coefficient) [0.115]   [0.115]   [0.252]   
          
Number of observations 6696   7752   5766   
Number of respondents 279   328   242   
Log Likelihood -1280.801   -1412.054   -1205.744   
All WTAC measures are reported in 100 GBP (PPP adjusted in the case of Norway). The figures in brackets are 95% confidence intervals for the means and standard errors for the 
standard deviations. The total cost attribute has been multiplied by -1 to make its coefficient positive. ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 – Institutional context 
 Norway England Scotland 
General financing of primary 
health care 
State & local taxes General taxation General taxation 
Coverage/accessibility 
(criteria for inclusion) 
Universal Universal Universal 
Contract/organization/location 
 
Independent GPs 
contracted directly by 
local municipalities.  
Individual patient lists  
Sometimes co-located 
with others, sharing 
administrative expenses. 
National Health Service, Westminster Parliament 
152 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) that commission primary 
and secondary care for the population within their 
geographic area 
Independent GPs contracted through practices. GPs are 
owners or employees 
Practices enter into a contract with the PCT 
Three types of contracts; GMS (55%), PMS (40%), APMS, 
PCTMS 
Some practices participate in practice based 
commissioning from 2005 
National Health Service, Scottish Parliament 
14 Regional Health Boards (RHB) 
Independent GPs contracted through practices. GPs are 
owners or employees 
Practices enter into a contract with the RHB 
Three types of contracts: GMS (90%), 17c (same as PMS), 
2c  
Incentive level Individual GP   
Relatively weak 
(indirect) incentives to 
keep costs down 
GP practice 
Strong incentives to keep costs down at practice level 
GP practice 
Relatively strong incentives to keep costs down at practice 
level 
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GP payment Fee-for-service 70% from 
the public security 
system, (NAV) 
Capitation 30% from local 
municipality 
Majority of income through capitation (GMS contract) 
25% through Quality and Outcomes indicators (GMS 
contract) 
Rest enhanced services (GMS contract) 
Practices in the practice based commissioning system can 
keep profits => strong incentives to keep costs 
(prescriptions) down. 
 
Majority of income through capitation (GMS contract) 
25% through Quality and Outcomes indicators (GMS 
contract) 
Rest enhanced services (GMS contract) 
No practice based commissioning 
Guidelines & 
recommendations for 
prescriptions 
For some conditions and 
procedures, but in general 
not enforced 
“Blue-list” indicating 
which medicines are cost-
effective. Prescriptions of 
medicines on the list are 
free/cheap 
Third party (NAV) refunds 
prescription costs, if on 
the blue list 
NHS through NICE provides a well incorporated system of 
guidelines and national recommendations of procedures 
NHS prescriptions indicating “approved” prescriptions 
with regard to effectiveness, and prices. 
Incentives to adhere to NHS prescriptions through the 
Quality and Outcomes framework 
PCTs pay for the prescriptions => have direct incentive to 
influence prescription behaviour  
PCTs sometimes have their own prescription guidelines 
and list of approved drugs 
Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) provides advice on 
new and older drug formulations.  
NHS prescriptions indicating “approved” prescriptions 
with regard to effectiveness, and prices. 
Incentives to adhere to NHS prescriptions through the 
Quality and Outcomes framework 
HBs pay for the prescriptions => have direct incentive to 
influence prescription behaviour  
HBs sometimes have their own prescription guidelines and 
list of approved drugs 
Patient co-payment 
Should vary 
On prescriptions and 
consultations, annual cap 
of  1800 NOK  
Some focus  
Flat user charge on prescriptions, but with exemptions => 
90% of all prescription items free 
 
Little focus 
Since 2007: staged reduction in user fees – full abolition in 
April 2011 
 
No focus 
Competition for patients 
Criteria – should be present 
Patients free to choose 
GP list. Possible to change 
list twice a year, 5,8% did 
so in 2010. 43,9% of lists 
Patients free to choose a GP list within their geographical 
catchment area. Possible to change list anytime. Most lists 
were open for new patients in 2014. Information about 
the number of switchers is scarce, but in general the 
Patients free to choose a GP list within their geographical 
catchment area. Possible to change list anytime. Most lists 
were open for new patients in 2014. Information about 
the number of switchers is scarce, but in general the 
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were open for new 
patients in 2010. 
L 
competition seems to have been low in the period 
studied.  
competition seems to have been low in the period 
studied. Less information available to patients interested 
in switching GP in Scotland. 
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Table A.2 – Significance tests 
 Norway vs 
Scotland 
Norway vs 
England 
Scotland vs 
England 
    
Effect 75%  *** *** *** 
(compared to 60%)    
    
Effect 90%   *** *** 
(compared to 60%)    
    
Patient costs 50 GBP/ 1000 NOK  ** *** * 
(compared to 0 GBP/NOK)    
    
Patient costs 100 GBP/ 1800 NOK     
(compared to 0 GBP/NOK)    
    
Patient prefers med. ***  * 
    
    
Doctor has good experience  * *  
with the med.    
Note: the tests are carried out using the using the complete combinatorial approach described  
in Poe et al. (2005). 
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A.1 More on institutional background in the three study countries 
Norway is among the countries in the world that spend the most on health, and the amount 
has increased over the last decade; from 4074 USD15 per capita in 2004 to 5388 USD per 
capita in 2010 (OECD, 2012). Primary health care services in Norway are universally 
accessible and financed by a mix of state and local taxes.  All residents in Norway are 
enlisted to a GP either by active choice or by designation. It is possible to change GP twice a 
year, and everyone has the right to seek help from whichever GP they want, while the GPs 
can receive any patient they want, but have obligation only to see patients on their respective 
list. The majority of Norwegian GPs are private practitioners contracted by local 
municipalities. Even though many are co-located with other GPs, this is mainly a matter of 
sharing administrative expenses, as all GPs have their own income and their own private list 
of patients that they are responsible for. GPs are paid partly by fee-for–services (70%) from a 
third party (the national insurance scheme, NIS), and partly by capitation (30%) from the 
local municipality. A very small share of their income comes from patient co-payments. The 
GPs are regarded important gatekeepers in the Norwegian health system, but they have very 
few binding responsibilities when it comes to keeping costs and referrals to specialist care 
down. Clinical guidelines have been developed for some conditions and procedures, but are 
in general not enforced. With respect to prescription decisions, Norwegian health authorities 
have developed a list of medications accepted for public refunding by NIS. If a GP without 
well-documented and accepted reasons chooses to prescribe medications that are not on the 
list, the patient is responsible for all costs. Pharmacies are encouraged to dispense the 
cheapest generic substitute, but GPs have the opportunity to deny generic prescription. 
Incentives to keep costs down are thus both indirect and relatively weak for the Norwegian 
GPs, while the system with competition for patients may drive costs up. 
Scotland and England have in many aspects similar health systems, with the majority of 
health services provided through their common National Health System (NHS).  The NHS is 
based on a principal of universal free healthcare at the point of access, financed through 
general taxation. The Scottish Parliament in Scotland and the Westminster Parliament in 
England have responsibility to allocate funds and regulate the health service provision to their 
                                                 
15 US dollars measured in current prices and PPP. 
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respective populations. All together the UK health system has like Norway increased its 
spending over time; from 2540 USD in 2004 to 3433 USD in 2010 (OECD, 2012).   
In England, at the point of survey, there were 152 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) that 
commissioned primary and secondary care for the population within their geographic area. 
Primary care was commissioned through GPs who are private practitioners organized in 
practices, which in turn were contracted by the PCTs. The most common contractual 
arrangement was (and remains at present) the UK agreed General Medical Services Contract 
(GMS) where the practice is allocated funds across three main dimensions. The largest 
proportion, just over half, is derived from a capitation based formula referred to as the global 
sum. Around one quarter of practice income is generated through the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework which awards points (and subsequently funds) across a range of quality 
indicators. Practices are also able to generate funds through the provision of additional 
“enhanced services”. In 2011, 55% of GP practices were contracted through the GMS 
contract in England and around 40% contacted through the Personal Medical Services 
Contract (PMS) where the contract is negotiated locally. The remaining practices were 
covered by the Alternative Provider Medical Services Contract (APMS) and the Primary Care 
Trust Medical Services (PCTMS).  
 
The system in Scotland is similar; 14 Regional Health Boards (RHB) commission universally 
accessible primary and secondary care for the population within their geographic area. 
Primary care is commissioned through contracts with GP practices where, as in England, GPs 
are independent contractors who operate within a practice. Around 90% of practices in 
Scotland are contracted under the UK-negotiated GMS with the remaining practices 
contracted under 17C contracts (equivalent to PMS in England) and a few ”2C” practices, run 
by Regional Health Boards. 
 
With slightly different twitches to the general formula, PCTs and RHBs are allocated budgets 
using a weighted capitation formula that provides a unified budget for the commissioning of 
hospital and community health services, primary medical services and prescription costs. The 
PCTs and RHBs set an indicative annual prescribing budget for each practice but once 
prescriptions are dispensed, the invoice for payment is sent to the respective PCT or RHB. 
The PCTs and RHBs have accordingly clear incentives to influence prescribing behavior, 
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which they do through local prescription guidelines.  In addition to national advice on 
prescriptions (by the National Prescribing Centre, the Institute for Clinical Guidance (NICE) 
and the Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) respectively) GPs are thus given guidance 
also by local bodies appointed by the PCTs and RHBs, with the local guidelines often being 
more restrictive. As independent contractors GPs are not obliged to follow non-statutory 
guidance provided by local formularies however, even though there is within the GMS 
contract, a clause that states that practices can be in breach of contract if they prescribe 
excessively or inappropriately. 
 
GP practices in both England and Scotland are provided with direct financial incentives for 
prescribing “right” through the GMS contract where in 2011 an additional 28 points were 
offered to reward GPs on reviewing their prescribing with local NHS managers. However 
these points are only a small proportion of the total points on offer (1000). English GP 
practices that at the time of survey were part of the practice based commissioning system, a 
reform in England introduced in 2005, also had the incentive that any savings against the 
indicative prescribing budget could be utilised in other forms of patient care as chosen by the 
practice. While there are many similarities between the two countries, this system did not 
exist in Scotland. Indeed the system in England has since the time of survey been 
substantially reformed; PCTs have been abolished and new NHS Commissioning Boards 
(NHS CB) been made responsible for commissioning of primary care in England through 211 
GP-led commissioning groups which GP practices are required to join. This represents a 
substantial reform to the NHS in England and is in effect a return to GP fund-holding for 
general practices within England, but on a mandatory scale.  
 
GPs in both countries prescribe medicines to patients using NHS prescriptions. NHS 
prescriptions are covered by the drug tariff which outlines the price that will be reimbursed 
for the drugs. A flat user charge is levied on patients in England, but an exemptions system 
results in around 90% of all prescription items being free. In Scotland there has since 2007 
been a staged reduction in user charges with the full abolition of prescription charges coming 
into effect in April 2011. 
 
 
